TY  - JOUR
T1  - Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina
AU  - Scharpf, Adam
AU  - Gläßel, Christian
Y1  - 2020/10/01
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/10/01
N1  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12475
DO  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12475
T2  - American Journal of Political Science
JF  - American Journal of Political Science
JO  - American Journal of Political Science
JA  - American Journal of Political Science
SP  - 791
EP  - 806
VL  - 64
IS  - 4
PB  - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd
SN  - 0092-5853
M3  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12475
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12475
Y2  - 2022/12/06
N2  - Abstract Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975?83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown.
ER  -